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"WHITHER NEPAL" D. R. Regmi

KATHMANDU, NEPAL 1952

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                                                                   CHAPTER FIVE  

 

                                                                     THE WAY OUT

 

         Let me now sum up the main points of conclusions emerging out of the analytical study of the problem that we made in the chapters preceding.

(1) The first point is Nepal's very low state of development, which is standing in the way of democratic progress.

(2) Secondly there is the vicious circle created by rulers in not opening the country for development, which again has shut the door for popular awakening.

(3) Thirdly as power is vested in a family ruling by virtue of proprietary rights the scope for a gradual transfer of power is narrowed and the via media position is altogether ruled out.

(4) This has led the rulers to prevent every possibility of a process of change from materializing, which has gone to delay the inevitable triumph of popular forces through a process of gradual change.

(5) But the same has rendered the character of the democratic movement into a full-fledged progressive struggle aiming at a social revolution subsequent to the overthrow of the present regime. The absence of an independent middle class, which accounts for the slow growth of the anti feudal movement further imparts to it a progressive characteristic to make it thoroughly roughly anti-feudal and anti-imperialist identifying wholly with the aspiration of the very downtrodden and suppressed.

(6) The main drawback, however, is the lack of organizational strength and behind the not insufficient popular awakening is the inability born of hard conditions, due to which Nepal so far has failed to canalize the rough temper of the age into the right course of action.

The low stage of development also paves the way for the palace feud to assert itself and render the ground of the anti-Rana struggle into an arena of domestic strife where democratic ideology finds little spacious latitude to work.

 (7) Developing further we come to the question, what is the way out? If only the evil sides of the picture were weighed it will look that all that we are endeavoring and fighting will go in vain as the country does not on the surface seem prepared for the results. But that will be the very pitch of pessimism carried too far, much too far. Persons of understanding and vision will not view things in that way. Having grasped the reality of the situation they will rather find it easy to trace the means in order to overcome the obstacles. These are not such as are baffling attempts of solution, no problem of the\ type suggested is so in the present context of national and international changes. The way out cannot remain in hiding if one only makes a serious search of it. Nepal shall be liberated and should be liberated. The present backwardness of the country and consequently lack of a strong democratic pressure over the rulers of the country will not for long hold progress. Feudalism will have to yield before the mounting strength of popular forces once they start to move upwards crossing the hurdles. A thorough knowledge of the counteracting forces and efficient handling of the situation will enable us to derive ways and means and to seize upon a correct line of action in speedy furtherance of the popular cause provided we do not suffer from a chronic disease of pessimism. And it will not take a long time to effectually control the limitations placed on our path by certain natural factors if alone we pursue a path taking lessons from our past experiences and act with caution and determination to that end.

(8) We have only to turn over the pages in chapter three of this volume to be able to confirm the statement. Ranacracy is not a strong force. Structurally it is based on the ignorance of the people. Its feudal built rests on a too crude and infirm foundation to be capable of resisting even moderate assault of popular awakening. Ideologically it stands worse chance of survival, for it is nothing but a primitive barbarism. Besides it is rent asunder from within, and its vitals are being corroded not only for want of the fresh air of modern civilization but also from a lock of internal cohesion and timely adjustment. One is perfectly right to say that the present administration of Nepal is not entitled to the nomenclature of a government as is understood in modern parlance, and therefore, its inherent weakness can better be realized. But it is being sustained by backwardness and ignorance of the people whose progress is retarded by a policy of denial and suppression consistently practiced by the Rana rulers. Once this state of affairs changes and there is born a widespread popular awakening the Ranacracy will experience a shake up and collapse at a single blow.

(9) Again if pessimism has no validity to rest on save as a short term phase a mental frame optimism relying only on external causes to work will prove a chimera and an insubstantial factor. No people have achieved its liberation solely by the aid of external factors how so ever favor able they might appear to be. External factors work as far as they go to encourage the tendencies to resistance and create a psychological background for the same, in some cases they tend to make Up the shortcomings by addition of material resources and provide a guidance' out of the wealth of experiences. But this presupposes an already existing movement within. This can never replace internal movement and fulfill alone the tasks the latter performs. Nepal's liberation will have to be worked out mainly by its own people through their own exertion. Exert they must howsoever favorably the international situation may be influencing the current of their history.

(10) Lastly it should be borne in mind that in the present period of world historical epoch of democratic changes Nepal cannot remain any longer in the grip of family autocracy that is evidently much outdated and outmoded. Howsoever grudging may be the rule withholding civic rights from the masses of the people, and conditions made tight for their restitution this grip will be loosened and democratic forces now smoldering beneath will be soon at work to erupt later on like a volcano. It will be unwarranted pessimism to attempt to ignore this vital factor. This is neither unwarranted optimism. There is not an insufficient awakening in the country, and the Nepalese people too, at least a section of it, is not living without knowledge of the movement for democratic rights since it had had a training in course of the democratic upsurge of the last two decades.

          So on both counts the moot point there is to develop popular consciousness steer it clear of confusions and through the many complications and obstructions of opportunism and help it to proceed along lines of organizational activity for the end sought. The line should be such as counteracts effects of unfavorable factors that have been so long acting to arrest the progress of democratic forces.

The question is as to how that is to be achieved. 

           Obviously the need of the hour, the panacea of all evils eating into our vitals is the coming into being of a strong militant political organization of the masses imbued with democratic ideology.

This means reversing the old line and treading a new path altogether. The tradition of aimless agitation and propaganda stunts will have to be given up. These without a solid organization do not take us far. Propaganda and publicity are important within the framework of a militant organization. They cannot be dispensed with.  But their value is limited by the structure and working capacity of the organization of which they form a side activity. Our main endeavor as far as the present condition of Nepal allows is to make these secondary giving top priority to the task of party formation and its consolidation. Any other arrangement which will not recognize the all-supreme importance of political organization will fall short of the needs of the hour.

The people of Nepal will have to pass through various stages before they go into the decisive battle against the ruling autocracy. The first is the stage of popular awakening and the second is the organizational expression of that awakening when it becomes intense. For the actual fight an organization is vitally necessary. There can be no two opinions on this point. But can a widespread awakening be generated through non-organizational activity or for the matter of convenience through a loose social organization of non-political origin? In considering this question we must not forget that ours is a peculiar situation under the most cruel and shameless autocracy. 

Nepal is ruled autocratically by the Ranas without even a semblance of constitution. The power of an absolute dictatorship is used to crush any attempt at introducing a constitutional Safeguards the do not and cannot tolerate constitutional agitation inside Nepal. The Ranas simply very idea of limitations on their powers and privileges in this set up is unthinkable. There is simply no place even for the most modest of it. No misconception should be entertained as to the impracticability of a suggestion for an open constitutional agitation within the frontiers of Nepal. It is entirely wrong to bring Indian analogy in the Nepalese context. Methods which were effective in India cannot stand in Nepal inasmuch it lacks totally the requisite atmosphere of unrestricted social activities. The most innocent social efforts individually or collectively made are banned if they are taken to be containing the germs likely to generate popular awakening in future. In Nepal it is a crime even to deliver religious discourses in open or private, not to speak of conducting political activities. The Ranas are used to viewing with suspicion any departure from the drab social atmosphere of the day wherever extant. Anything done by way of constructive efforts to alleviate social suffering attracts their notice and is frowned upon. Besides risking punishment one incurs the very danger of suppression of the entire programme as soon as he encounters the attention of the autocrats. It is no use citing examples where there have not been open victimization. These could exist as a lifeless process of constructive programme in a very limited sphere, whose purpose in the long last could not remain undefeated. If the results Tulsimehar Shrestha, the Nepali disciple of Gandhiji, obtained after his hard labor of thirty years were to be judged in right prospective there would be one and only one conclusion and that is that his scheme of social uplift through propagation of the cult of hand spun and hand oven textile industry was a barren jitter as much as it failed to educate the persons engaged in the trade towards civic consciousness. Rather, the regrettable fact has been his being reduced to the old phantom of ignorance through a process of mechanical adaptation  to the spinning wheel and mule. In an endeavor to dispel doubts about himself entertained by the autocrats and establish his loyalty the sponsor  had quite forgotten that it was futile to strive to attempt develop civic sense in a gathering of people suffering from a fear of victimisation by purely constructive methods based on Indian models.. This was economism pure and simple but attended with the worst form of manifestation, which went to narrow down the very scope of the programme to mechanisation and stultifying of the humanity connected with the same. Now it is clear that the Charkha, Gandhi's spinning wheel, taken singly as a programme of constructive work is useless to perform its task. In Nepal for lack of opportunities for other items of programme due to prohibitory regulations it is also a fact that the spinning wheel has to stand without any companion instruments, of popular advancement. 

Thus the constructive work as a whole loses its meaning as far as its applicability goes. It is only to betray one's ignorance of Nepalese condition to have stressed the need of this type of work which does not find receptive field under the present regime.

People not conversant with this aspect of the problem prescribe a wrong remedy in the form of modest beginning to cover as an initial phase some part of the constructive programme as mentioned by Gandhiji. It is, however, in the nature of challenging the authority of the Ranas that one dares to have pushed this remedy into practice. And we know what the challenge will be followed by. Anyone with his head above the shoulders will not advise embarking on this challenging task just for the reason that this leads to the results which were to be avoided. Considered in all its aspects the present day condition of Nepal offers little ground for open work of social importance however harmless and modest that may be to minds habituated under the favourable atmosphere of India.

Constructive work is not an end in itself. It is a road leading to the uplift of the masses and to their awakening. If some of its items do not fulfill that purpose without the whole being implemented it is  not worth trying them at all. In other cases where these have to be undertaken as a cover to hide the real character of the programme understood to generate a degree of popular awakening these will serve only to provoke the suspicion of the State authorities and expose the authors to immense risk. There is therefore absolutely no point in implementing a part of such a programme even if this could be done.

All this points out that in practice the talk of modest beginning or of social activites loses its meaning, and attempts at securing re forms with the help of non-organizational work will be set at naught. The proposition that the existence of apolitical organization is not essential for the first stage is totally inva1id. But the same dictates that this political organization should not assume the character as is given to it in ordinary circumstances backed up by a tradition of democratic administration. It must conform to the objective condition of the country wherein it has to work. In Nepal the normal bui1t and working of apolitical organization must be such as is suited to one following an underground course of action.  

When nothing open can be done the alternative is to go under ground. The plan must be adjusted to this fundamental factor. It is obvious that p1ans covering constructive programme of the type attended to are not workable out of the surface. They must be worthy of risk involved and ill nature and efficacy all embracing. This is fulfilled only by an all out effort at dealing a blow to the factor which is responsible thus far for the condition obtaining to arrest the growth of democratic forces. The line may be strictly single, but will not be a unilateral affair. In order to make it a total instrument of fight the same has bad to be developed, consolidated and strengthened or else it will be a poor show and die a premature death. For a country autocratically ruled like Nepal where civic rights do not exist anything done otherwise ignoring the underground nature of work will only spoil the issue and delay the process of emancipation. Before they tread an open path of political work the Nepalese democrats shall have to undertake a course of action in preparation to that end, which should be shrouded in absolute secrecy. 

We are alluding to a network of politica1 organization spread all over the country and functioning in secrecy far removed and shielded from the keen gage of the Rana's (both group) spies. Our emphasis is on a political organization of active workers. The period of propaganda without organizational basis has to be taken completely ended. Illusions of the sort that a non-organizational propaganda is enough for the time being has now to be cast off. Similarly those who think that far a modest demand for elementary civic rights there need not be a strong political organization to back up are entirely wrong as our experiences of work showed and the whole idea has now to be revised. Lastly the organization is to have not only a secret functioning but to have also a structural solidity with aims and objects of advanced and far reaching character.

The Rana autocracy is desperately trying to maintain its hold intact. It would not permit even the very elementary concession to the demands of the people for civic rights. The overthrow of autocracy is, therefore, the one principal issue before us. Any attempt at compromise in disregard of this fundamental issue is not only a wishful thinking entertained but is likely to produce untold harm to the cause of democracy. We must not forget that the policy and programme of going slow and modest are as impracticable as far as their acceptance by the autocracy goes as any other involving revolutionary changes. This compels us to relinquish compromise solutions of the problem even as a strategical medium to the final aim of liquidating autocracy and to adopt a courageous and comprehensive objective from the very starting point that aims at the immediate fulfillment of an advance democratic programme. The issue must be taken for direct and straight decision and not for any kind of making half way compromise that is circuitous and impracticable. The most advanced political ideology combined with the strongest possible line of action will alone arouse the masses of the people towards revolutionary struggle to which therefore all our energies should be directed. A political victory of the people over Ranacracy will alone open the vista for all other kinds of progress social and economic to which without doubt our fight must be concentrated in all eventualities.

We said in the last paragraph that our main task is to build up a political organization of active workers. The question of making the organization whole and sole a functioning apparatus is inextricably connected with the nature of work in hand, which is to prepare militant cadre acting incognito. Only a party of active workers will fit in with the requirement of the task. Unless there are a sufficient active people in the party, the agitation as well as the organization program will remain in abeyance. We must find a way to impart to the party vigor and a true missionary zeal. But the party in this respect must outstrip the stage of a mere talking body. The very preliminary condition of existence of an under-ground political organization is its active cadre. We have to see before any thing else that we have adequate number of trained hands for the job. Our party cannot any longer afford to be only a body of men confining their activites to the passing of high-sounding resolutions. This chapter must end. The usual luxury of an armchair middle class politician is too much a burden on our shoulders, which we are unable to bear. Nothing is more important for us than the task of making our cadre active. This is the primary task, on which will depend the development of the organization and its consequent progress of work.

When we come to translating the above into action we have to unhesitatingly recommend the absorption of a clause for active membership in the party constitution. Let only such people as can put in certain amount of active work to the cause of the party be entitled to be members. For other categories of people let there be a sympathizer’s card. If we strictly observe this provision it will not be before long that an organized body of professional revolutionaries begins to function.

Discipline in the rank is the most essential feature of a political party, which generally means action. To this we must bestow special attention and even at the risk of overdoing a sense of discipline will have to be inculcated to avoid straying of workers to a wrong path or indiscreet action. A disciplined rank will also not be prone to loose talking, and hence a guarantee against unseemly betrayal and leakage of secrets to the enemy camp. A fighting political party is not the less important than an organized army in the battlefield. It must move with one mind and under one direction. A strict observance of the rules of conduct will tend to introduce this type of mind and a spirit of obedience and respect towards the leadership. Discipline ensures unflinching loyalty of the cadre to the cause and faith in the leadership of the movement. A tradition of discipline cannot but foster sound qualities of dynamic personality, of perseverance and steadfastness for the cause of democracy.

With strict discipline a spirit of loyalty to the party must be fostered, and this loyalty must on no account be secondary. Although at first sight the party organization runs in the nature of a united front but it must never share the looseness, which characterizes such an organization in some countries. Our party structure has to be unfailingly a cohesive and homogeneous body if it is not to share the fate of the loosely federated organizations. Dual membership is the main feature, which has to be discarded without losing time. This is a factor, which contributes to increasing disintegrating tendencies. Our experience has been that all those who join the organization as only a broad base of the different parties combining do not owe primary allegiance to its policy and programme but consider it a side issue to participate in the activities pertaining to Nepalese democratic movement. Unless and we ban dual membership this mentality will stick for long with detriment to the development of the organization in question. Our cadre must be a wholly professional revolutionary cadre as far as possible and be trained in that line to be able to devote exclusive attention to the work of the party and its allied and associate organizations. Our task will remain ever unfulfilled if we continue to ignore this aspect of the problem. There is no use in recruiting to the rank of the party such persons as do not in any way prove actively helpful to its cause. This consideration will also exclude from actual membership all those people who though not members of other political parties have so long played an arm chair politician's role. Our endeavor must be to free the party from doubtful elements and save it from degenerating itself into a concert of sleeping partners and this is best achieved by enjoining on the party members regular active work and by exacting from them undivided allegiance and loyalty.

To revert to the organizational aspect of the problem: Let there be a secretly functioning network of political organization covering entire portion of the country. It will not be a difficult task to organize our party in that line if alone we insist on the qualitative rather than the quantitative built of the party to be equipped for the enormous task of fighting the entrenched autocracy, for such an organization numerical strength is immaterial as secrecy demands a personnel of a high integrity and character and naturally enough persons of high character and integrity could not be found in large numbers to make the same in the present conditions. Even if we could obtain a committee of five persons working in each district, that will not be a mean achievement and will not be inadequate for the preliminary organizational activities. And allowing the committee to conduct its lone programme of building up an organization in the area we shall pave the way for the emergence of a solid political party organized and consolidated to give a heavy assault on the enemies.

The party is the organizer and leader of the movement. Naturally the cadre must be efficient and ideologically conscious and honest and the same time well organized and disciplined. Such a party can not afford to let its membership keep open to all but the few fitted to bear the responsibility of the task, and the few will have to be politically educated as to the party line and ideologically indoctrinated before they are sent on the errand. A training camp and study circles for the prospective members will have to be conducted for the purpose in India, where we enjoy every facility in that direction. But this may not be enough as many interested persons may not be forthcoming for the reason that the Nepalese C. I. D. are keeping the track of the persons conducting the camp and the Indian C. I. D. will assist them in their work. Probably a good deal will depend on the rank and file however numerical1y poor, who will have the advantage of reading he situation and possibilities thereof by their own experiences on the spot. It is also possible that in the beginning the ideological aspect of the organization will not be farther stressed than what is strictly necessary. As a rule ideological strength enhances only when there is a long record of sacrifice and suffering behind. Real leadership will emerge in course of the struggle, and we should not be disappointed at the poor result of the work and of the specimen turned out in the initial stage.  

We cannot enter upon the actual course of the struggle without sound preparation and proper organizational background. Nor a single phase of the struggle can become decisive. It is also true that the first phase of the struggle will have to be launched solely to bring about revolutionary consciousness amongst the mass of the people and not for decisive results, which will mean less preparatory action than what is requisite for the final show down. And because the contradiction within the system of feudalism is getting sharper day by day, even the first phase of the struggle will be attended with tremendous success and the following circumstances will be such as will tend to bring to the fore all dormant qualities of leadership in the party since engaged in the struggle.

While we emphasize secrecy of work within the frontiers of Nepal, this is not our intention to make our organization a mere conspiratorial body wedded to a policy of individual terrorism and to the cult of violence. Individual terrorism can never be a substitute for the revolutionary democratic movement wherein the mass of the people participates. It only reveals a crass mental confusion and a psychological frustration of the type degenerated to destructionist behavior. Individual terrorism is always destructive. A terrorist has no ideology and his vision is blurred. He is as far removed from the mass of the people, and is careless of consequences. He is only interested in destruction and construction is far from his mind. Where there is a conflict between a few/individuals as to the capture of power terrorism may become decisive and not engender chaos. But it is that only within an autocratic set up that such a plan can work as a decisive factor. It is, however, not on that account that terrorist methods can otherwise be freed of its dangerous potentialities. Terrorism has never behaved in a way to respect for democratic ideals, and could never be practiced for democratic ends without the prospect of contrary results.

The general belief in the efficacy of terrorism in Nepal has its roots in the tradition and history of the palace where uptil very late coups formed a regular feature of practical politics. But a terrorist forgets that he does not plan any coup, for it can be done only by people within the circle of the palace aristocracy and in his case not democratic change but only capture of power by equally autocratic elements is the immediate perspective. He thinks that by terroristic methods he can intimidate the bullies to mend their ways, but here too he misfires. for the Rana family is too much entrenched to be thus cowed down and will react to terrorism with more fierce repressive measures. The logical corollary of individual terrorism in the circumstances will be that while the people will run a greater chance of being terrorized at the hands of the rulers it will at the same time remove the possibility for the formation of an organization further in proportion as people lose courage in that course. Terrorism diverts the people from an organized fight, and therefore is most injurious to the cause for a country like Nepal, which needs a fighting organization of the people ore than anything else. A terrorist will not only create a condition of repression in the country but will ultimately endanger the prospect of the early fulfillment of the task. And speaking for himself it is most likely that certain interested cliques will use him. A terrorist misleads others while deluding himself.

          When we stress the need of a secret organization, we have in mind neither individual terrorism nor a conspiratorial attempt. Our method shall remain strictly peaceful and non-violent. But we aim at organizing a strong revolutionary force working with peaceful methods, which can be built up in course of time through a secret preparatory work. The primary task is to elude the vigilance of the secret servicemen of the Ranas, so that the growth and development of the organ is at ion is not impeded by the arrest of the workers at their hands. Anything done to attract the notice of the police will set the machinery of disruption against the organization. Action of the type giving a clue to the police has had to be avoided at any cost and hence the secrecy of work emphasized. No matter it goes against a part of the tenets of nonviolent resistance, secrecy cannot be I eschewed from the organizational activity of the Nepalese democrats.  It is the principal feature.

 The organization must be built up in way that it lies there as a smoldering fire to break out in flames as soon as conditions ripen for a flare up. Secrecy of work within a limited sphere has an overriding importance considered in that light. It will be childish to sacrifice secrecy of work on the ground that ours is a mass movement. A mass movement must for its own sake have behind it a solid organization maintaining the energy and continuation of the struggle. By any other way there will never come into being a solid organization, which will again put off the date of decisive conflict with the forces of reaction. We must bear in mind that the only constructive task for us today is to build up a mighty fighting organization and we must pool our resources to that end. If we succeed in forging an organized party inside Nepal our fight will bear a character that will command vigor and stability of a military force and will be in a position to carryon the fight nonstop howsoever repressive the other side may prove to be. But without a secret and absolutely underground work such organization will not be formed. A hackneyed method of non-organizational front is bound to fail at one or another stage of the fight without producing appreciable results.  

 Notwithstanding the need for absolute secrecy in matters of organizational activity, it is sad that people have been indulging in open activities without any forethought of its repercussions on the progress of the organization. A hasty step ignoring the value of underground work lead to the break up of the whole organization confined to the free atmosphere of India. For Nepal as long as there does not develop a secret militant organization, the workers cannot all afford to be vociferous and throw themselves in the fray premature. For the time the organization extends its influence, there must prevail as much secrecy as possible even if it may be taken for a lull. Once we create a party organization expanding its sphere of work to every nook and corner of Nepal, the agitational side of tile work will not prove so difficult. The party can launch a movement out of the material it gathers in course of the preparatory stage. Governmental repression and arrest of members as a sequel to open work at that stage will not exhaust the resources of the party. An organized political party is a never drying reservoir and if it is there the next move will logically follow with greater speed and intensity. So we should not by-pass the important question of organizational activity in a craze for agitational programme. The latter will be automatically facilitated in case a strong organized party is brought forth to work out the programme. There is nothing valuable and efficacious like the solidly built organization of the revolutionary workers for the sort of condition that is obtaining in Nepal at the present time under the suffocating atmosphere of the autocratic regime and all other factors must have a subordinate place in our programme of action.

We postpone the observation on the social composition of the party to a place somewhere following. Here it suffices to note that the organization because of its strictly secret functioning will not be run on formal constitutional lines. An organization run to every detail of the constitutional procedure is impossibility in the circumstances obtaining in present day Nepal wl1ere the primary consideration in all such works is to avoid being detected by the police. The fact that much of the preparatory work is being done in India is no argument for formal democratic practices. The agents of the Ranas are infesting our habitat in sufficient number to be able to sense the nature and scope of our underground activities; Even in India we cannot afford to be carelessly outspoken as to the vital matters concerning our organization at least that part of the programme operative inside the territorial limits of Nepal. The identity of the underground workers, their inter- district links, their means of communication and matters, of the type just in line with these can be made available to none but a very small number of reliable persons of tried caliber and proved integrity at the top with a glorious records of suffering and sacrifice engaged in the work of organizing the party. This not only demands complete separation of the two types of work, open and underground and for each to be guided as distinctly two functions but also a centralized guidance by a single leadership of the qualities just mentioned that will preside over both and maintain an organizational link between these two types of work in order that a harmonious adjustment arid coordination of the two spheres of activities is not impaired. The cadre will have to be made politically conscious to be able to understand the value of a centralized leadership so that it is not misled by demagogues to demand suicidal methods of bureaucratic electioneering and book keeping facilities and criticism in a like fashion. The procedure adopted in these matters by political parties of India, which work under legal conditions is quite at variance with the one required by the exigency of the situation under autocratic rule and, therefore it should find no favor with the Nepalese democrats. There is a greater danger of the organization being disintegrated at the very beginning if we do not enlighten our cadre about the principles and working of a secret party organization.

The more backward a country is the greater is the need for a sound and honest leadership to wage a political fight. It is no easy task to organize and lead a backward people along the path of social ii revolution and release them from the deadly grip of the tyrants. Men of exceptional ability and knowledge imbued with the highest motive of patriotism and of love for the, country are needed to play the role of liberators. But a backward country suffers generally from shortage of meritorious men who can bear the responsibility of this gigantic task. We have to be extraordinarily alert in the matter of selecting the vanguard of the anti-Rana struggle. An inadvertently misplaced choice may lead the party to ill repute or worse than that to annihilation and thereby spoil the cause of democracy. As it obtains in a condition of poor awakening opportunist trends in patriotic activities of our of our country are making themselves felt, and mediocre and megalomaniacs are rushing in to occupy the vantage ground. If their bid for leadership were to be allowed to go unchallenged and not resisted the Nepalese democratic movement will find for long stewing in its own juice without making any headway. Our politics may not have developed any much higher towards maturity, our ideological growth may not be such as to shut out the prospect of deviation from the revolutionary path but the dangers of betrayal by the leadership acting within the frame work of palace alignments are none the less minimized just for these reasons. For the Rana or any other capitalist elements it is not difficult to corrupt these men of base ambition if only because we are passing through a crisis, and our rank is not immune from tendencies of deflection and vacillation. The organization will have to be kept free from the baneful influence of the opportunists and demagogues, the former because they sell their principle as it suits them, the latter because their activity breeds indiscipline and disintegrating tendencies. Our democratic movement is just taking shape and our organization is in the state of making. Anything preached and propagated to create confidence in the Ranas or in any other autocratic setup by referring to their readiness to influence plans of reform diverts the people from the path of consistent opposition to the regime in the same way as does the hostile criticism of the movement designed to malign and defame the uncompromising leadership. 

In the past we have suffered much on account of opportunist leadership and anti-democratic activities of certain individuals, the result of which has been so harmful to the growth of a solid political organization.

 A correct appraisal of the situation and unwavering attachment to the cause of democracy on the part of party leaders are the two things necessary for the successful development of the movement. But these will not come unless the opportunists and demagogues are kept at bay and the party leadership is entrusted into tile hands of the very faithful and consistent fighters for freedom. A complacent attitude on the question of leadership of the party is most undesirable from every standpoint. There is no excuse to rely on the drift of events that are calculated to bring forth right leadership at the moment through their long course. Opportunism and demagogy have to be combated in all seriousness from the very beginning. Now that we have to our credit at least a decade old democratic party work there is all the re compelling reason to be particular about the apolitical organization is a fighting body, and more so for a country like Nepal where it has to establish its foot hold against the counteracting repressive policy of the autocratic rulers. It would be unwise to put such organization on par with loosely standing parties as they function in countries like India. Yet some people look upon the organizational activity as something in the nature of shopkeepers' behavior. What matters for us today is the sort of activity, which creates a body of self-less disciplined workers. It does not matter if we could not maintain an office and records of work. These are secondary but we shall gain a great deal if We succeed in establishing contact with the conscious elements in every nook and corner of the country through a body of active political workers. We may not even press for the formal enrolment of members and keep register of the names thus enrolled. No other form of organization is commendable. Each branch of the organization will have two divisions just as works inside Nepal and India are divided. There will be no organic link between these two divisions save at the top, which will generally; function from outside Nepal. The divisions will be one for organizational work and another for propaganda. Agitation inside Nepal will cease except, as a whispering campaign conducted by fellow travelers whose arrest will not physically affect the numerical strength or the structure of the organization. Those engaged in the organizational work will only select the personnel and prepare them for agitational programme to commence along with the open struggle in an appointed time. Care should be taken to ensure that the source of propaganda in the area is not revealed to persons outside the immediate circle of those engaged in. that division of work. Also at the moment of open struggle these and the principal organizing elements in each region must not expose themselves to the police.  

The workers in the areas have to disguise their identity as is ordained by the secret nature of work. The question of eluding the vigilance of the s pies by wearing a proper disguise is a very important one. For this it is necessary that during the tendency of organizational activity nothing in the nature of evoking their suspicion is done or given rise to. While this recipe is to be fulfilled very strictly, it will be nevertheless not out of order to take up social works wherever the ruling autocracy permits but this will have to be conducted in order not to expose the members of the party but rather to conceal their real character and give to the agencies wrong ideas about the same. A teaching institution can absorb some of the men engaged in the task, and these can very well command influence in a particular locality, which will prove tremendously valuable at a time when these men resort to action in open manner.

The brunt of the work to coordinate these varied activities will naturally fall on the leadership of the movement, and here again its importance cannot but be driven home fast. If we repose confidence in wrong persons, the consequences will be disastrous. Let there be sufficient alertness and real understanding on that point.

One of the factors confusing the problem of the selection of sincere and honest leadership has been the similarity of outlook on democratic questions of their men in the field; who seem to be quarrelling more over personal issues than on ideological grounds. But this is only so on superficial observation. Deep down these quarrels there is always a conflict of opinion as to ideology and programme of  action. This has sharpened in course of the time the democratic movement proceeded in a march towards the goal with the attainment of even new experiences. We know that the opportunist trend does not fit in with the texture and spirit of the organization just outlined in the above paragraphs but it does not mean that we too should be still on the side of ideological vagueness. To meet the requirement of the exigency we have in the previous chapter defined the aims and objects of the Nepalese democratic movement. The political party which has its policy statement nearest to this definition, which has pledged itself to bring about social revolution and which unequivocally stresses all these satisfies the minimum condition of support by the mass of the people who will find it their true friend. As we have observed in the beginning, there is no justification for the adoption of modest programmed on the...... of tactics, because nothing is separate from the question of the overthrow of Ranacracy which knows no compromise on the part of the people's representative. This attitude betrays opportunist tendencies, which have to be condemned in the severest term possible. Those who extend hands of cooperation to the rulers on the basis of the so-called moderate programme are rank opportunists. The other camp is of real democrats and fighters, of those who will never seek compromise with the autocrats and of those who want a revolutionary change of the state apparatus. The Nepalese democratic movement will receive a safe guidance in the hands of these leaders. 

                                      The social composition of the party and its allies

Now to the social composition of the organization. When the struggle in question is between the Rana family and the classes under subjugation, the latter trying to emancipate from the grip, the party in class composition cannot but be a composite body representative of the groups assembled in the duniyadar, a name used for the people standing in antagonistic relations with the rulers and their parasites. This will differ from a party, which solely represents the proletariat section of the people in as much as its members are not confined to the proletariat classes, but also belong to this class and others in the low strata, the peasants as well as the small proper-tied lower bourgeoisie, and revolutionary intelligentsia. Our party is thus not only a united front of the suppressed multitude, we call them the people as opposed to the ruling class and the compradors, but by the same reason becomes also a fit organization to effect and complete the democratic revolution. The absence of capitalist middle class in the country being a special feature of social relations owing to its feudalist economy makes at the same time the development and consolidation of the organization along a non-capitalist course a matter of normal process and an inevitability where from the danger of the restitution of the status quo ante given the success of the democratic revolution with this united front is entirely removed. It will be, however, necessary to watch the shift in the lower middle class particularly the trend towards the upgrade and to keep the party free from the contamination resulting from the of same. It cannot be denied that the parasitic Bharadar class does originally belong to this group, and there is at present a growing section within the ambit of the small propertied class, that is looking   to the aristocracy for certain advantages in life. Let us call it the upper crust of the lower middle class. As an intermediary section and with bourgeois prejudices and aspiration this is the most irresolute, inconsistent and treacherous section. The party faces a difficult task of freeing itself from the leading strings of this section. In the nature of the class composition of the organization, it will not be possible to check the entry of persons harboring middle class sentiments. As the prospect of the democratic revolution grows brighter these will be attracted to join the struggle and more will find place in the camp. But this will be a definitely undesirable from the popular point of view. If the leadership of the struggle passes into their hands, and this is not unlikely due to very conspicuous position they hold as educated and intelligent group the character of the movement will undergo a change and it will run in the interest of one class trying to dominate all others. The present opportunism in our rank is the manifestation of the inroads made by this element. It is possible that the form in evidence at the moment is not serious enough to call for action directed to immediate uprooting. But it has sufficiently betrayed its anti-people and anti-national tendencies and therefore deserves to be dealt with properly with a view to guarantee the popular character of the organization. We have seen from the analysis submitted earlier that to there is an attempt to sabotage the organizational activities of the party by various dubious tactics sometimes by a recourse to a heinous compromise and surrender and sometimes by demagogic methods of generally maligning of the whole patriotic front irrespective of parties and individuals in order to bring it down in public estimation. This is done obviously to ingratiate the rulers in order to obtain concessions for their petty aspiration. But the harm done to the struggle is beyond repair. The tendency if further allowed to grow is likely to bring in its train the entire consolidated force of reaction, which will be firmly seated in power as soon as the present phase of half hearted handling of the situation passes. It is sure that today's the almost inactive lead given by the parasitic hangers-on and managing agents of the Ranas will outstrip the bounds of monetary help and advice and assume a significant role of active participation in the conflict and establish complete hegemony over the movement. The interest of the democratic struggle demands that such an eventuality should not be allowed to appear. But for this mere stressing the democratic character of the movement is not enough. All approaches by big vested interests to the movement will have to be closed by constitutionally preventing the entry into the party of all the elements that are overtly or covertly undemocratic. Let only those who are professional revolutionaries subscribing in unequivocal language to principles of democratic revolution find a place in the organization. The anti-imperialist, non-capitalist and anti-feudalist character of the struggle will not be impaired if it is carried under the hegemony of apolitical organization that not only adopts unalloyed classless democracy as its objective but is also in class composition thoroughly purged of all feudal and fascist sentiments and similarly we cannot give room to a programme based on anti-communism, and this we have to do for the reason that anti-communism is an out and out reactionary ideology presented in the garb of democracy. I may also suggest that the anti-imperialist and progressive character of the movement should be asserted through the party constitution to exclude from its ranks all but well confirmed and dynamic anti-imperialist and anti-fascist elements of the present day democratic camp, and belonging to the classes not tied in any way to the chariot wheels of the feudal Ranacracy. We have observed that as a class the upper section of the lower bourgeoisie does not come up to the standard laid down. We shall do well to recruit our ranks from the dispossessed and proletariat strata, and educate them in theory and practice of the particular nature of the struggle in question before they are sent up on party tasks. The theoretical side of the question must receive our best attention for on this will depend ideological make up of the organization, which if molded on progressive line will serve as a guarantee against undemocratic deviation and betrayal.

As to the allies we must not shut our eyes from the activity of those who are trying to use the threat of advanced ideology and popular awakening for their own personal ends to wrench concessions from the Ranas. We cannot do without the educated youth of the comprador lower bourgeoisie but when it is a matter of recruiting them into the party leadership we should see that they are ideologically declassed to shake off their class dependence on the Ranas and this must obtain recognition in the constitutional frame- work of the party. We should in the same way exercise utmost caution in distinguishing the illiberal and liberal wings of the oppositional section in the feudal Rana family and their dependents, between those that are solely for restitution of lost privileges and those that are for certain kind of democratic reforms and equal rights in the state. While we have to fight the former, it is all the more essential that we do not merge with the latter and at the same time expose their basically selfish role and compromising tendencies even though we shall have to join with them on some issues as against a particular enemy. Nor we can afford to lose our predominant position to them. Howsoever determined they may appear to be against the present autocratic regime, the fact that they fight for reforms and not' for social revolution makes them very unreliable as allies of the people. It is occasionally found that either they waver in their task at a critical moment owing to their basically anti-people breeding and prejudices and then come to terms with the opponents or emerge downright as a resurgent fascist force in the hour of victory in order to wrest fruits of victory from the fighting people.

Evidence of a tendency to exploit the situation of growing popular awakening for revengeful action and for effecting their own ascendancy under garb of democratic sympathies has not been wanting in the hidden or open political activities of the aristocratic dissenters. We have already referred to the repercussion of such activities on the organizational built and progress of the movement which was found to be definitely injurious and retarding. Here let me draw popular attention to another aspect of the problem which so for had evaded our notice. There has been in progress a stealthy practice to enact Kemalism in the heat of democratic upheaval. Some discontented members of the Rona family think they have to only organize a military revolt in the nick of time and the power will be theirs by virtue of the timely action. They attach secondary or little importance to a popular organization and it value is appreciated by them to the extent that it creates in the masses of the people a consciousness of their condition and tendency to fight out the administration as the root cause of their depraved condition. The technique of assault falling outside the scope of Kemalist militarism is helpful to them as a secondary factor. They are acting for selfish ends distrusting the people and we have to expose and oppose tooth and nail such actions on their part. But the futility of the whole move is also thereby patent and any one with a developed political mind would not fail to discern it. To try to organize a military force for the capture of power without enthusing its personnel with patriotic zeal and with knowledge of the cause they are fighting for is a rank bankruptcy of intellect and betrays strategical and tactical error. Without a revolutionary philosophy to illuminate their path the men so trained will prove very much unequal to the task and it will end in fruitless adventurism. The armed revolt without the mass of the people at the main base is an illusion in the context of democratic revolution if it were not ill conceived for a purpose entirely different but there too the method will prove ineffective.

Thus we have surely to take note of the moves and counter- moves of our enemies and opponents as well as of the allies. But it will nevertheless be a tough proposition to try to draw a line of demarcation between the two camps in this fluid and transitional stage of political development. The possible enemies get certainly mixed up with the possible friends and allies. We cannot place undue checks and balances on the composition and stress too much ideological purity of the party unless we are prepared to face very many other difficulties of grave character. It is, however, very needful to devise correctiveness to the situation. To me it looks that the remedy can be provided by insisting on and always striving to have in the executive of the party only men declassed enough' to think in terms of a full democratic revolution and carrying out the struggle under the hegemony of the organization of the duniydar. The question of the leadership of the movement cannot be dismissed from its context. Not only the course of the movement before and during the struggle but the very question of how the fruits of the successful revolution will be shared amongst the various participants depends on the character of the leadership, on what sort of hands the strings are placed. This is important also from another angle of vision. As the tempo of the struggle rises, all the discontented elements including the rebellious section of the comprador Bharadars will be drawn into its vortex for some reason or other and many such persons as have basic reactionary prejudices will creep along with. We shall not be able to prevent them from entering into the arena as our allies for the reason that our strategy demands a complete unification of all forces against the Ranas whatever be their inner character and utilizing the front to make the democratic revolution a success. It will be unwise to accentuate the differences, and exclude even one such element from the purview of the same. But we will defeat the   very purpose of the struggle if we fail to keep watch on the practices of the unreliable allies and do not check them in time. At least one such ally the comprador Bharadar will have to be constantly checked and pulled back because although he may fight to secure certain rights from the hereditary rulers he will not hesitate to compromise with them and sabotage the struggle when these are conceded. The harm will be immense if the Bharadar gets the leading position at the united front, as he will try his utmost to deprive the ordinary people of the fruits of these concessions. Therefore just as we cannot afford to include men of doubtful, intention and ideology in the central executive of the party organization so it will be simply suicidal not to press for the establishment of the hegemony of this body over the entire front of the anti-Rana fighters. In any case we shall have to provide adequate safeguards in order to see that the struggle is carried to its logical end and that the people is placed in full central of affairs after the period of struggle is over and this will be the best done by maintaining intact the influence of the suppressed multitude over the organization.                             

                                                 The Task at the moment  

The organizational aspect of the Nepalese democratic problems has as yet received little attention a t our hands. But we cannot afford to neglect it any longer. The sooner we pull our energies into the task of building up a strong political organization under experienced and centralized leadership the better will be the prospect of a victorious struggle against Ranacracy. We have a long and arduous journey before us. But once we succeed in building up such an organization all other problems will find their speedy solutions. The people of Nepal are certainly on the path of awakening, and each day further they are expected to develop additional consciousness, which will make it easy to weld them together in a militant organization. We must take each and every opportunity of organizational activity by the forelock as it unfolds in that course. If we could proceed on a right line, all the evils of low political consciousness, of internal dissention, of race for leadership of parochialism, opportunism and extreme sectarianism will automatically disappear. Through the organization also will emerge trained revolutionary personnel, which will implement the policy and programme of the movement to its logical conclusion with a fair amount of success.

Having presented in detail the possible shape and structure of the organization let me now state as to how best to form it and particularize the materials out of which it could be easily formed. We have already started the process. Our men though in a circumscribed sphere have taken up positions. The large number of arrests and terrorism practiced by the ruling clique is evidently setting the masses of the people against the rulers and enlivening their consciousness as to the line of resistance. But we have not been able to organize the democratic movement in keeping with the general requirement of the case involved. We are yet suffering for want of a qualitatively strong and quantitatively large party organization. Let us devote the entire energy to creating such an organization. We have not tapped all sources, we have not even touched many of them, and leave aside places inside Nepal. We have failed even to utilize the materials available in India. We could very well organize the Nepalese student communities of the various Indian universities as well as the laborers working in different urban centers, tea gardens and mining areas. These are not trash materials. If we could turn them, their potential strength to the cause, to the right side, lo the advancement of the cause, a deep chasm in our organizational life would be filled up. Given the proper training and lead we shall make out of them a battling contingent, which will serve each at its base a strong outpost of democracy against Ranacracy in the coming fight. The utility of the migrant youth, student and labor lies in the fact that they return to Nepal at one or other time and if they could be sent back to the mother country as loyal soldiers of democratic freedom we had really achieved a great deal in the attainment of our goal. 

 The value of a party organization should not be underrated. Our enemy is not small. Whatever may be the defects of medieval administration and its weak condition judged by a higher standard, it cannot be denied that compared to the camp of democracy in Nepal the camp of the autocrats commands much better and greater resources and possesses an organized instrument of oppression. even though one may not give it the name of a Government. The Ranas have an army however primitively trained: they have a police force however insufficient and ill equipped: they have their agencies planted in every important place of the entire territory, who look after their revenue interests even if they are not any more fit to run a higher standard of administration than the savages to dwell and manage a modern sky crapes. We know that the feudal machinery known as the Government of Nepal is more a muddle than an administration and at the critical time when faced with a countable popular assault will crush like a ramshackle hut before a tornado. But there is no running away from the discomfortable fact that ours is not as extensive a contact as theirs and we maintain slender resources in strict comparison. We may not need to bring our level of consciousness and organizational strength to the degree that it matches with the organized parties of advanced countries. We may even not feel any disappointment over the relatively poor leadership of the party center and its units. But we cannot dismiss the over all need of extensive contacts, the need of having our men in at least those centers where the Ranas also maintain their tax collectors and that of their being in caliber equal if not superior to the Ranas' district and sub divisional officers who, we know, are without exception not much educated and trained. We must set up district and sub divisional branches as a parallel network of agencies standing ready to cope with the administrative machinery of the Government. Then and there alone our struggle will be countrywide, will pervade through each anti-Rana element of the society, will make a rapid stride and produce the utmost beneficiary results. Let the important task of organizational activity on the line just drawn be not minimized. Until we develop the most widespread organizational contacts and make these contacts cover the largest portions of the country, whatever we do not an attempt to launch a campaign of open struggle, will meet with not much of success. For us the task of building up our party organization comes therefore above every other task.

It is totally wrong to suggest that the camp of the autocrats is confined solely to the legitimate members of the Rana family .This suggestion is sometimes inadvertently made out of the consideration that the Rana family is split from within and its feudal behavior evokes universal contempt. We have ourselves presented the question in that form where considering the contradictory forces of the regime. But there are opponents and opponents. All of them are not alike. While some are engaged in the fight to carry it to the end some are only there determined to go onto the half way. The latter are doubtful allies and they shall return to the fold as soon as they feel that a common danger threatens the system as a whole. Thus the legitimate members of the family are not alone fighting the feudal side. With them are ranged all the reactionary and illiberal elements-all the Bharadars and big estate holders. We have already made note of this aspect of the problem in earlier pages. There is an additional factor cropping up. Today due to international polarization of forces the Ranas command the support of like elements of the external world as well. It is therefore no easy job to destroy the Nepalese feudal autocracy without weakening its links with the international reactionary forces.

                                                                   The plan or action

I have in mind two stages of open struggle. The one I call preliminary and the other I call final. Tactics and slogans will differ from one stage to the other. These will have to be adjusted in accordance with the immediate programme and objective of the movement in particular stages. As for the objective the first stage will be directed to generate as much widespread awakening as is possible in the circumstances. The second stage will cover a plan of decisive struggle and will invoke action leading to the final overthrow of the present regime and to the consequent transfer of power into the hands of the people. The interval between these two different stages will depend on the nature of the result obtained of the preliminary stage of the open struggle but will not be necessarily too long to be of indefinitely protracted duration of the preparatory phase nor it will take a long time to start the first. All the same unless and until a well organized party wedded to the ideology and programme of advanced character comes into existence the scheme of active and open struggle will not be put into operation. As regards the plan of action there is nothing that we can foretell here about the second stage, which will mainly take shape on the basis of the subsequent state of popular, awakening, and of organizational strength of the party, and international situation. The first, however, will be one principally demonstrative in character, and through an organized medium will push the programme of extending the agitation phase to inside Nepal to enable the people in every nook and corner to hear the message of democracy. The struggle will embody three main features: (I) it will start as suddenly as will not allow the opponents any opportunity to make arrangements to prevent it by arresting the suspects. (2) It will operate in all units with the leadership solely underground and secret preparations simultaneously proceeding (3) it will make the widest possible mass contacts in the operative stage having the people themselves in the thick of the struggle. Whatever may be the duration of the open struggle and utmost efforts will be made to prolong it to the limits, the be all of the movement will be to harness in peaceful and nonviolent manner the organizational strength in order to take full advantage of the situation as it comes then with the unprepared ness of the government leaving the area without any policing in continuance of the present policy. Even if we could go for a week without being interfered with by the Ranas, men we shall have achieved the results of several years of chequered work and it will not be difficult to obtain a least a week under conditions prevailing. One of the charges leveled against underground functioning of the organization has been that it fights shy of the masses. The open movement will, however disprove this charge in as much as the resultant condition will find masses brought nearer to the organization which will show that the underground functioning was in reality only a device to avoid the spies in order that the work of establishing party contacts proceeds smoothly and party strength gradually accumulates. Other details will be worked out at the appropriate moment.

Much of the second phase of the struggle will depend on how the first is conducted on whether it gives the anticipated result. So we shall have to exercise utmost discretion in the matter of conducting the campaign as well as putting in adequate preparation towards the same. Both the preparatory period and the period of campaign are important. In the preparatory period we should devote all efforts to building up a network of militant organization, a factor that we have stressed too often. This has to be integrated with the agitational programme conducted on the border and in India that will be intensified to coincide with the approaching hour of the campaign, the latter is no less important for us an operational base to conduct press campaign and popular agitation. Agitation and propaganda on the border areas and adjacent provinces of India will help the development of the movement in so many ways. The weekly paper and periodical pamphlets and leaflets will serve as a classical organizer for inside Nepal as well as a propagandist far inside the Nepalese inhabited areas of India. Enlightening public opinion on this side, both Nepalese and Indian, about conditions in Nepal we shall able to enlist abiding support and sympathy of our neighbor for the cause, which will also stand to counteract any help the autocrats obtain from their international allies. We shall be playing into the hands of the agent provocateurs and demagogues if we fail to understand the implication of this particular counteracting factor. The Ranas both the ruling and dethroned are out to sabotage our organizational activity and use varied dexterous methods which present the growth of sound leadership from our midst and strong public opinion. All the three aspects of the movement the agitation, the propaganda and organizational have to be carried on in equally intense manner And let it not be forgotten that while we stress the urgency of organizational activity, we have done so as to make up the shortage to want to show that the party organization must precede the other two but not that the latter should be sacrificed. *

 

* This article was written like the preceding ones two years ago as a guide to political work of the party. But circumstances even though outwardly have changed since then, for example, today the RANA family has gone out of power and although the king now replaces the autocratic premier in the administration we enjoy to a limited extent certain rights of citizenship. One may therefore question the validity of the recipes prescribed for conditions where there existed absolute denial of civic rights. I myself feel that other things being equal, and even the organizational aspect of the struggle not changing, we must try to fully utilize the advantages offered by the new conditions. So the secrecy so repeatedly stressed in the past will give way to open work, and this will be adopted even if there may come new obstacles in the way if gagging freedom in the name of security is resorted to. Our sole concern in the new conditions must be to educate the people about their rights and freedom, and this we must do boldly, openly and fearlessly. Any occasion of clash with the authorities must be used to generate greater energy and resistance in the mass of the people, and to expose the false character of reforms introduced. With the new changes the days of secretly working organizations are over; unless, of course, old denial of civic rights is to come back, which is impossible in view of these being heralded in the name of democracy. Nothing would be erroneous than to pursue a policy of ignoring this fact alltogether, and not to emphasize the basic human rights in the new atmosphere. What is required today is a pure and simple constitutional fight waged to maintain the freedom we wrested from the Rana rulers. It cannot be denied that the first requisite of a background for such a fight is the independent judiciary. As long as judiciary continues to be medieval and a subsidiary agency of the Home Ministry the prospect of popular rights being immune from the encroachments of the executive is bleak indeed. So let us pool our resources as a part of constitutional fight for securing at the earliest moment a fully democratic and independent judiciary and a modernized code of law. This must also be accompanied by demands for the ending of the present interim period and for earliest elections to the constituent assembly, which will create a popular ministry chosen by and responsible to the adult citizens of the country. We must be prepared to court imprisonment in the course of a nonviolent and peaceful campaign of agitation if the men in power practice deception and try to postpone the election beyond the date fixed in the last proclamation i.e. beyond the winter of 1952-53. As peaceful pursuit of democratic way of agitation and propaganda comes under fundamental rights, anyone who tries to suppress this particular activity will expose himself to popular scorn and hatred, and thus a wider path for further agitation will be created to the advantage of the party in opposition fighting on these issues.

                    ....

 



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